Justice Brennan and Freedom of
Expression Doctrine in the Burger Court

EDWARD V. HECK*

INTRODUCTION

Justice William J.Brennan has been the senior associate Justice
of the United States Supreme Court since the retirement of William
0. Douglas in 1975. Appointed by President Eisenhower in 1956,
Justice Brennan now has served on the Court longer than all but a
handful of Justices.' His years of service span most of the Warren
Court era and the entire Burger Court period. He has authored
many of the Court's most significant opinions during these years.2
His changing role in the Court's decision-making process highlights
changes in the Court's orientation during his tenure. Once the "glue
of the liberal majority" 3 during the late Warren Court, he became
the Court's leading dissenter in the relatively conservative Burger
Court.4
For many years Justice Brennan's contributions to the Court's out* Associate Professor of Political Science, San Diego State University. B.A. 1968,
University of the South; M.A. 1971, University of Virginia; Ph.D. 1978, Johns Hopkins
University.
1. Earlier Justices who served more than thirty years on the Court are Bushrod
Washington (1798-1829), John Marshall (1801-1835), William Johnson (1804-1834),
Joseph Story (1811-1845), John McLean (1829-1861), James M. Wayne (1835-1867),
Stephen J. Field (1863-1897), John M. Harlan (1877-1911), Hugo L. Black (19371971), and William 0. Douglas (1939-1975). CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., THE
SUPREME COURT: JUSTICE AND THE LAW 166-67 (2d ed. 1977).
2. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976). See also B.
PREME COURT -

3.

SCHWARTZ. SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUA JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 206 (1983).

Totenberg, Conflict at the Court, Washingtonian, Feb. 1974, reprinted in
75/76 at 162 (1965).
Heck, Changing Voting Patternsin the Warren and Burger Courts, in JUDI-

READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

4.
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80, 82 (S.Goldman & C. Lamb eds. 1986).
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put received only sporadic attention. More recently, his role as a
coalition builder and as the driving intellectual force behind Warren
Court decisions has been recognized by judges and scholars alike.' In
a massive narrative documenting internal politics in the Warren
Court on a case-by-case basis, Bernard Schwartz recognized Brennan as Chief Justice
Warren's "most capable lieutenant" 7 and a
"principal ally" 8 to whom "the Chief was to assign the opinions in
some of the most important cases decided by the Warren Court."
Similarly, Warren biographer G. Edward White labeled Brennan
"Warren's judicial technician" 10 and noted Brennan's talent for
"supplying doctrinal rationales for decisions in which Warren
strongly believed."" In a recent tribute, Judge John J. Gibbons described Justice Brennan's criminal justice opinions as "the most literate, technically proficient, historically sound, and persuasive" produced during the "golden years" of the Warren Court. 2 Analyses of
the Supreme Court's work focusing on Brennan's importance have
now begun to appear in newspapers and popular journals as well as
in scholarly works."3 As Justice Brennan completes his thirty-first
year of service on the Court, the time is ripe for a careful assessment
of his work on an issue-by-issue basis.
One area of constitutional interpretation in which Brennan has
made a major contribution is the development of a theory of freedom
of expression under the first amendment. In a tribute published in
honor of Justice Brennan's completion of fifteen years of service on
the Court, former Justice Arthur Goldberg noted that Brennan had
emerged as the "principal architect" of the Court's freedom of expression doctrines. 4 Particularly significant is his opinion in New
5. McKay, Mr. Justice Brennan, and the JudicialFunction, 4 RUT.-CAm. L.J. 44
(1972); O'Neii, Mr. Justice Brennan and the Condition of UnconstitutionalConditions,
4 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 58 (1972); Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court
Liberalism, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 841 (1980); Michelman, Mr. Justice Brennan: A
Property Teacher's Appreciation, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 296 (1980).
6. Gibbons, Tribute to Justice Brennan, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 729 (1984); G.
WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 185-86 (1982); B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at
205-06; Hutchinson, Book Review, 81 MICH. L. REV. 922 (1983).
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

B. SCWHARTZ, supra note 2, at 204.

Id. at 205.
Id. at 206.
G. WHITE, supra note 6, at 185.
Id.
Gibbons, supra note 6, at 736.
Markman & Regnery, The Mind of Justice Brennan: A 25-Year Tribute,
NAT'L REV., May 18, 1984, at 30; Hager, Brennan Now a Dissenter as High Court
Edges Right, L. A. Times, July 5, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Serrill, The Power of William
Brennan, TIME, July 22, 1985, at 62; Taylor, Brennan: 30 Years and the Thrill is Not
Gone, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1986, at 18, col. 3; Hager, Brennan, Near 80, Holds Firm to
Court Post, L. A. Times, Apr. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
14. Goldberg, Mr. Justice Brennan and the First Amendment, 4 RUT.-CAM L.J. 8
(1972).
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York Times v. Sullivan,15 which embraces the idea that the protection of political speech is "the central meaning of the First Amendment."1 Derived from the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn, this
doctrine is premised on the need for absolute protection of speech
about public officials and governmental policy in a democratic political system. 17 Murray Edelman has labeled this approach the "functional contract" theory of democracy1 8 and has identified Brennan as
the Warren Court Justice whose first amendment opinions most
closely reflected Meiklejohn's views.1 "
The primacy of political speech clearly is one of the major themes
running through Brennan's first amendment opinions during the
Warren Court years. In Roth v. United States,2 0 he noted that the
first amendment "was fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people."' 21 While obscenity was not protected by the first
amendment, cases involving speech on the issues of the day were to
be decided in light "of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public
officials." 2 2
Among Brennan's Warren Court opinions that reflect this same
emphasis on the primacy of political speech are NAACP v. Button,23
in which Brennan indicated that interest group litigation is a form of
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. Id. at 273. Although Justice Brennan used the phrase, "the central meaning
of the First Amendment," in his majority opinion in New York Times, it was Professor
Harry Kalven who more clearly explicated the implications of this notion for first amendment theory. Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191. According to a more recent commentator, Kalven's commentary on New York Times is "one of those rare pieces of legal scholarship that adds content and definition to a decision while purporting to 'interpret' it."
Bollinger, Elitism, the Masses and the Idea of Self-Government: Ambivalence About the
"Central Meaning of the First Amendment", in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 99 (R. Collins ed. 1980).
17. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), reprintedin
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PEOPLE 1
(1960).
18. M. EDELMAN. DEMOCRATIC THEORIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 211-44
(1984).
19. Id.at 217.
20. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
21. Id. at 484.
22. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
23. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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political expression entitled to first amendment protection, and Dombrowski v. Pfister,24 in which he wrote that federal courts might enjoin state criminal prosecutions, undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, in order to avoid chilling effects on protected
expression. Never a first amendment absolutist in the tradition of
Justices Black and Douglas, Brennan has recognized the need for
balancing in first amendment cases. According to Justice Goldberg,
Brennan rejected the "ad hoc balancing" approach of Justice Frankfurter in favor of "definitional balancing," which involved "a testing
of societal need for a certain class of expression against the policy
reasons advanced to curtail it."'25 Under such a balancing approach,
the nature of the speech for which protection was sought was one of
the factors to be weighed, with political speech clearly occupying a
preferred position in the constitutional scheme. While a public official was required to prove "knowing or reckless falsity" in order to
prevail in a libel suit against critics of his official conduct, he was not
to be foreclosed entirely from recovering damages as Justices Black,
Goldberg, and Douglas preferred. 26 A similar balancing approach
may be seen in Brennan's efforts throughout the Warren Court years
to locate "the vexatious line between freedom of artistic expression
and proscribable obscenity. ' 27 Although Brennan is noted for liberalizing the law of obscenity, 28 he continued throughout the Warren
years to distinguish between speech involving commercial exploitation of pornography and political speech.
The major question addressed in this Article is how Justice Brennan dealt with freedom of expression issues during the Burger Court
years. What kinds of first amendment claims was he most likely to
support? What reasons for his decisions did he offer in his opinions?
In light of his position that efforts wholly to suppress obscenity are
no more justifiable than suppression of speech at the core of the first
amendment's protection, 29 did he continue in the Burger Court years
24. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. Goldberg, supra note 14, at 9-10.
26. Compare New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (majority opinion) with Justice Black's concurrence, 376 U.S. at 293-97, and with Justice Goldberg's concurrence,
376 U.S. at 298.
27. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT

264 (2d ed. 1985).

28. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion) (material
cannot be deemed obscene unless it is "utterly without redeeming social value").
29. Only in 1973 did Brennan announce that he had rethought his earlier position
that "obscenity" was unprotected by the first amendment. "I am convinced," Brennan
declared, "that the approach [to reconciling obscenity statutes with the First Amendment] initiated 16 years ago in Roth v. United States and culminating in the Court's
decision today, cannot bring stability to this area of the law without jeopardizing fundamental First Amendment values, and I have concluded that the time has come to make a
significant departure from that approach." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
73-74 (1973) (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
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to focus on the- "central meaning" of the first amendment? Has he
continued to base his votes and opinions on the functional contract
theory of democracy?30 Or has he moved toward a broader natural
rights theory emphasizing individual self-fulfillment? 1
In investigating these questions, this Article examines both Justice
Brennan's voting record and his opinions in first amendment cases
decided since the appointment of Chief Justice Burger in 1969. Justice Brennan's votes in different types of first amendment cases initially are analyzed and then are compared to the voting records of
his colleagues on the Burger Court.32 In the opinion analysis, major
themes running through his opinions are investigated in an effort to
determine whether his votes are rooted in a coherent doctrine of
freedom of expression and, if so, whether he has moved away from
his earlier reliance on a functional view of the first amendment.33
THE VOTING DATA

The data set which is the basis for this analysis of the voting behavior of Justice Brennan and his colleagues consists of 204 plenary
docket cases decided during the first sixteen years of the Burger
Court (1969-70 through 1984-85 terms). The cases included in the
data set are those in which a litigant (usually an individual or organization challenging governmental restrictions on expressive activity)
explicitly raised, and the Court resolved, a first amendment freedom
of speech, press, association, or assembly claim. 4 Also included were
cases raising significant issues of access to a federal judicial forum
for resolution of a substantive first amendment claim.3 5 Only those
30. M. Edelman, supra note 18, at 211-44.
31. Id. at 171-208; T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6
(1970).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 34-53.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 54-205.
34. These freedoms are conceptualized as component parts of a broader notion of
freedom of expression. The justices themselves have recognized that the explicitly guaranteed freedoms of speech, of the press, and of assembly and petition are closely intertwined. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980). Moreover, the
Court has recognized that the implied "freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas" is closely related to the explicit guarantees of the first amendment. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). Brennan's views on the interrelationships among the first amendment guarantees are developed in McDonald v. Smith,
472 U.S. 479, 485-490 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
35. These "access" cases typically involve issues such as whether federal court
abstention is required pending state court resolution of cases presenting first amendment
questions. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Middlesex Ethics Committee
v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
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cases in which a first amendment claim was resolved after oral argument are included. 36 An opinion resolving more than one case (multiple docket numbers) was treated as a single case except in a few
instances when the Court resolved two or more distinct first amendment claims on different votes.37
Tables 1 and 2 below provide an overview of Justice Brennan's
voting record in the first amendment cases of the Burger Court. Table I reports the first amendment support scores for each of the Burger Court justices as a percentage of the cases in which that justice
supported the litigant asserting first amendment rights. Only Justice
Douglas (91.7% first amendment support score) was more likely to
support assertions of first amendment rights than Brennan (79.7%)
during the Burger Court years. Others whose individual first amendment support rates exceed the average for the Court as a whole
(44.1%) are Justices Marshall, Black, Stewart, Stevens, and Blackmun (though barely). Of the justices in this group who served
through a substantial portion of the Burger years, only Brennan's
close ally, Justice Marshall, comes close to matching Brennan's record of support for first amendment values. While Table 1 clearly
provides support for the generally accepted view of Brennan as an
outspoken supporter of civil liberties, a comparison of his voting record with that of Douglas should suffice to reject the hypothesis that
Brennan has evolved into a first amendment absolutist.

36. Cases decided per curiam without oral argument are not plenary docket cases
and were, therefore, excluded from the data set even if printed in the front section of the
United States Reports. Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the 1970s, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1709, 1724-25

(1978).
37. For example, the two cases decided on the basis of the per curiam opinion in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), were counted separately, because the Court upheld
the contribution limit provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments on a 6-2 vote, while striking down the expenditure provisions of the Act. Justice
White voted to uphold all of the Act's limitations on spending, and Justice Marshall
voted to uphold the provision limiting a candidate's expenditure of personal or family
funds. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun would have struck down both the
contribution and expenditure provisions on first amendment grounds. For similar rules
for counting cases, see Spaeth & Altfeld, Influence Relationships Within the Supreme
Court: A Comparison of the Warren and Burger Courts, 38 W. POL. Q. 70, 72 (1985).
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Table 1
Support for First Amendment Claims, 1969-1985
No. of Cases
Percentage
Support
91.7%
79.7%
75.4%
70.8%
61.4%
57.7%
44.2%
44.1%
41.2%
39.3%
34.8%
32.0%
31.3%
23.1%

84
Douglas
192
Brennan
195
Marshall
24
Black
153
Stewart
104
Stevens
197
Blackmun
204
COURT
165
Powell
201
White
201
Burger
25
Harlan
48
O'Connor
169
Rehnquist
Just as Table I confirms widely-held beliefs about voting tendencies of the Justices, so Table 2 confirms that alliance patterns in first
amendment cases resemble those found in other studies of judicial
voting behavior. 8 Although Brennan frequently voted with Justices
Douglas and Black during their last years on the Court, only Marshall has been a reliable ally throughout the Burger years. The Brennan-Marshall agreement rate of 94.2% clearly indicates a general
identity of outlook in first amendment cases, even though they
reached opposing conclusions in eleven cases, perhaps most notably
because of Marshall's greater reluctance to apply the "knowing or
reckless falsity" standard of Brennan's opinion in New York Times 9
in later libel cases.40 Although not close allies of Brennan in the
same sense as Justice Marshall, both Justices Stevens and Stewart
Scheb & Ailshie, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the "Freshman Effect,"
11-12 (1985).
39. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
40. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157
(1979).
38.

69

JUDICATURE 9,
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voted with Brennan in more than three-fourths of the first amendment cases in which they jointly participated. Among the other
members of the Burger Court, Brennan's agreement scores range
from 64.0% for Justice Harlan (in twenty-five cases) to a low of
38.8% with Justice Rehnquist. Noteworthy in light of its potential
impact on opinion assignments41 is Brennan's relatively low rate of
agreement with Chief Justice Burger (49.7%).
Table 2
Agreement Rates with Justice Brennan:
First Amendment Cases, 1969-1985

Marshall
Black
Douglas
Stevens
Stewart
Harlan
Blackmun
Powell
White
O'Connor
Burger
Rehnquist

Percentage
Agreement
94.2%
87.5%
83.4%
77.9%
76.5%
64.0%
59.5%
58.5%
58.4%
57.5%
49.7%
38.8%

No. of Cases
187
24
84
95
143
25
185
154
190
47
189
157

An overview of Brennan's voting behavior in various types of first
amendment cases reveals that he has been strongly supportive of first
amendment claims in a wide variety of contexts. For example, he
supported first amendment claims of public employees in fourteen of
fourteen cases42 and invariably supported litigants who asserted violation of their first amendment rights by military or Selective Service
authorities.43 In addition, he backed first amendment claims of the
41. See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
42. See, e.g., CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (Hatch Act restrictions on partisan political activity do not violate first amendment rights of federal employees); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (state merit system act does not
violate rights of state employees). Justice Brennan joined a dissenting opinion by Douglas
in Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 595, and filed a dissent in Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 621.
43. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (officer's conduct in urging black enlisted men to refuse combat duty not protected by first amendment); Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. 828 (1976) (regulation banning partisan political speeches on military base does not
1160
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press in all cases involving the free
press-fair trial conflict44 or a
4 5
press claim of "special privilege.

In order to compare Brennan's votes in different types of first
amendment cases with the record of the Burger Court as a whole,
the 204 cases in the data set were divided into ten broad categories,

focusing on either the type of expression that gave rise to the litigation or the specific constitutional claim asserted by the litigant seek-

ing judicial enforcement of first amendment rights. The results are
reported in Table 3 below. Among the most striking features of this

table is Brennan's strong support for first amendment claims across
all ten issue areas. Brennan supported, without exception, the free-

dom of speech and freedom of association claims of public employees
and was particularly solicitous of first amendment claims in the demonstrations, nonlabor picketing, and symbolic speech contexts (88.2%
support). In addition, Brennan supported first amendment claims in
at least eighty percent of the cases in the obscenity-pornography,
freedom of the press, and commercial speech categories, as well as in
the miscellaneous freedom of speech grouping.

violate first amendment); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (regulation requiring
command approval prior to circulating petitions on base does not violate first amendment); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 458 (1985) (selective prosecution of nonregistrants who publicly announced opposition to the draft does not violate first amendment);
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (military base is not a public forum for first
amendment purposes). Justice Brennan dissented in each of these cases.
44. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) ("gag order"
violates first amendment); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (first
amendment implies right of press and public to attend criminal trial).
45. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (newsman has no constitutional privilege to refuse to testify before grand jury).
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Table 3
Support for Major Categories
of First Amendment Claims 1969-1985
Brennan
Percent
Supported

Court

No. of
Cases

Percent
Supported

No. of
Cases

Public Employment*

100.0%

14

42.9%

14

Picketing,
Demonstrations,
and Symbolic Speech
(nonlabor)

88.2%

17

70.6%

17

ObscenityPornography

86.2%

29

33.3%

30

Freedom of Speech:
Miscellaneous

85.7%

28

26.7%

30

Freedom of the
Press

83.3%

36

50.0%

40

Commercial Speech
(including lawyer
solicitation)

80.0%

66.7%

Labor Speech**

71.4%

25.0%

Political Money &
Corporate Speech***

66.7%

12

66.7%

12

61.5%

13

28.6%

14

61.5%

26

44.4%

27

Access to Federal
Judicial Forum
Freedom of
Association****
Totals

79.7%
192
44.2%
204*****
Includes both freedom of speech and freedom of association
claims of public employees.

**

Includes freedom of association claims.

***

Includes all claims that raising or spending money constitutes
protected expression.

**

Excludes labor and public employee cases.

*

Each case was placed in only one category. All cases are
included.
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Equally striking is the contrast between Brennan's votes and the
position of the Court as a whole. Only in the political money and
corporate speech area does the Court's record of support for first
amendment claims match that of Justice Brennan (66.7% support
rate). In all other categories, the differences between Brennan and
the Court are substantial, most notably in areas in which the Burger
Court has been most reluctant to recognize first amendment claims,
such as obscenity-pornography, access to a federal judicial forum,
and labor speech. Even in the freedom of association grouping,
where Brennan's first amendment support rate reaches a low ebb
(61.5%), he is noticeably more supportive of associational rights than
the Court (44.4%).
The final question addressed in this analysis of voting patterns in
first amendment cases is whether the decisions of Justice Brennan
and his colleagues on the Burger Court are consistent with Brennan's
earlier emphasis on the primacy of political speech. The first step in
this stage of the analysis required separation of cases in which a
litigant sought protection for political expression from those involving nonpolitical expression. In making this distinction, it was necessary to consider the nature of the message that gave rise to the litigation in each of the 204 cases in the data set, rather than simply
combining categories of cases from Table 3. A case was considered a
political speech case if the original message involved the kind of
speech essential to ensure that "debate on public issues

. . .

will be

' Messages dealing explicitly
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 46
with elections and the functioning of a representative system of government were readily classified as political speech cases. Like most
dichotomous classification schemes, however, a division of all
messages into "political" and "nonpolitical" has the potential to
cause difficulties in application. 7 Particularly difficult are marginal
cases in which the Justices themselves disagreed about whether the
speech in question was political speech. 8 Because "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and

public officials" 4 are crucial aspects of political speech in a demo-

cratic polity, the criterion adopted here classified as political speech
46. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
47. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 326-27 (1978); Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971).
48. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Compare the Connick majority opinion, 461 U.S. at 154, with Brennan's dissent, 461 U.S. at 163.

49. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
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cases all those in which the speaker's message criticized government
policy directly or indirectly,50 or raised questions about the performance of public officials51 or the qualifications of candidates for public
office. Also included in the political speech category are those cases
involving access of press and public to information about the activities of all branches of government, that is, the "information necessary for the public to perform its function of holding government
institutions accountable."52 Fihally, those cases involving a claim
that the first amendment guaranteed a right to affiliate with others
in support of candidates or policies, or a right to spend money in
support of favored candidates or positions, were classified as political
expression cases. Any remaining doubtful cases were classified as
nonpolitical, as were cases in which a litigant sought first amendment protection for essentially commercial speech aimed primarily
at enhancing the speaker's economic well-being.53 Of the 204 first
amendment cases in the data set, 106 were classified as political
speech cases and 98 as involving nonpolitical expression.
If a Justice is, in fact, basing his or her decisions on the the notion
of the primacy of political speech, it seems reasonable to anticipate
that the Justice would be significantly more likely to support a first
amendment claim in political speech cases than in those involving
nonpolitical expression. Table 4 below compares the support scores
of Brennan and his colleagues in political speech cases with their
scores in cases that do not involve political speech. On the whole, the
data provide limited support for the proposition that the.Justices
base their votes largely on the "central meaning of the first amendment." Brennan voted to support first amendment claims in 82 of the
101 political speech cases in which he participated (81.2%), but he
was almost as likely to favor the freedom of expression claimant in
the nonpolitical speech cases (78.0%). In short, Brennan supported
freedom of expression claims across the board without any particularly strong preference for claims involving first amendment protection for political speech. Overall, ten of the thirteen Justices were
more likely to favor judicial enforcement of first amendment guarantees in political speech than in nonpolitical speech cases, though generally the differences are quite small. Of the six Justices who voted
in favor of the claimant in more than half of the cases in which they
participated, only Brennan, Marshall, and Black appear to have
50. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (use of profanity in expressing opposition to the draft is protected by first and fourteenth amendments).

51. Thus, Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), was classified as a political
speech case because an assistant district attorney's questionnaire concerning office practices reflected on the job performance of the elected district attorney.

52. Lewis, A Right to Know about Public Institutions: The First Amendment as
Sword, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 1,2.
53. A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 17, at 87.
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leaned even slightly in the direction of special protection for political
speech. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Stevens actually supported
first amendment claims at a higher rate in the nonpolitical expression cases, though the differences between the two types of cases are
quite small. The more conservative members of the Court (particularly Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell) have supported first
amendment claims in political speech cases at a higher rate than in
nonpolitical expression cases, but the fact that each of these Justices
(including Justice Blackmun) voted against first amendment claims
in a clear majority of the political speech cases suggests something
less than a strong commitment to the primacy of political speech.
Table 4
Support for First Amendment Claims in
Political and Nonpolitical Expression Cases, 1969-1985
Political Expression

Nonpolitical Expression

Percent
Support

No. of
Cases

Percent
Support

No. of
Cases

Douglas

88.9%

45

94.9%

39

Brennan
Marshall

81.2%
76.0%

101
100

78.0%
74.7%

91
95

Black

75.0%

16

62.5%

8

Stewart

60.0%

80

63.0%

73

Stevens

56.9%

51

58.5%

53

COURT

50.0%

106

37.8%

98

Powell

47.6%

82

34.9%

83

Blackmun

44.6%

101

43.8%

96

White
Burger

41.9%
41.3%

105
104

36.5%
27.8%

96
97

Harlan

41.2%

17

12.5%

8

O'Connor
Rehnquist

37.5%
26.2%

24
84

25.0%
20.0%

24
85
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While Justice Brennan's voting record sheds some light on his position in first amendment cases decided during the Burger years, it is
necessary to examine his opinions as well in order to understand the
constitutional theory underlying his votes. Thus, the next section of
this Article analyzes Brennan's opinions in first amendment cases decided since 1969.
OPINION ANALYSIS

Throughout most of the Warren Court years, Justice Brennan was
the closest ally of the Chief Justice and frequently was assigned the
task of writing the Court's opinions in major constitutional cases,
including those involving interpretation of the first amendment.5 4
During the Burger Court years, by contrast, Brennan frequently was
at odds with the Chief Justice. In light of earlier findings that Burger rarely assigned opinions to Brennan in "important" cases," it is
not surprising that he did not write the Court's opinions in a large
number of first amendment cases. In the first sixteen years of the
Burger Court, Brennan was the author of majority or plurality opinions in only seventeen cases, 56 significantly fewer than the Chief Justice himself (thirty-six opinions) or such Burger allies as White
(thirty prevailing opinions), Powell (twenty-five opinions), or Rehnquist (twenty-four opinions). In four of these seventeen cases, Brennan failed to win majority support for his opinion and, thus, spoke
only for a plurality of the Justices participating.57 Nonetheless, Justice Brennan's opinion output in first amendment cases since the ap54. Political scientists studying the opinion assignment practices of Chief Justices
and senior associate Justices have noted a tendency to assign opinions to the Justice
whose views are closest to those of the opinion assigner, particularly in the most significant cases before the Court. Rohde, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 652 (1972);
Rathjen, Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S.
Supreme Court: A Replication, 18 AM. J. POL. Sci. 713, 720 (1974); D. ROHDE & H.
SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 172-92 (1976); Slotnick, Who Speaks for
the Court? Majority Opinion Assignment from Taft to Burger, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 60,
72-75 (1979).
55. Spaeth, Distributive Justice: Majority Opinion Assignments in the Burger
Court, 67 JUDICATURE 299, 303-04 (1984).
56. Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410
(1971); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion); Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441
(1974); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452 (1974); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976) (plurality opinion); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (plurality opinion); Nixon v. Admin'r of Gen'l Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455 (1980); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
(plurality opinion); F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984);
'Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
57. See supra note 56.
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pointment of Chief Justice Burger in 1969 constitutes a considerable
body of work. In addition to his signed opinions, he must be regarded as the co-author of the Court's per curiam opinion in Buckley v. Valeo. 58 Moreover, he frequently has amplified his position in
separate opinions, writing lengthy concurring opinions or brief concurring statements in twenty-five cases and dissenting opinions or
statements in no less than forty-two of the 204 first amendment
cases decided during the first sixteen years of the Burger Court.
Many of these dissents represent major statements of Justice Brennan's mature approach to first amendment issues, perhaps most notably in the 1973 obscenity cases.59 Although it is hardly to be expected that these opinions would reflect a completely clear and
coherent theory of constitutional interpretation, it should prove useful, nonetheless, to examine them for the light they shed on Justice
Brennan's own explanation (or perhaps rationalization) of his voting
behavior in first amendment cases.
On some first amendment issues, the basic thrust of Brennan's
opinions is clear and straightforward. In obscenity cases decided
since 1973, Brennan generally has taken the position that the statute
under review was unconstitutionally overbroad under standards set
out in his Paris Adult Theatre I dissent.60 In the libel area, he has
sought consistently to apply the New York Times standard of knowing or reckless falsity and extend it to new situations, even while the
majority was curtailing its use."1 In access cases, he views the federal
courts as the primary guardians of constitutional rights and federal
court abstention as appropriate only when the litigant has a fair opportunity to raise his first amendment claims in a pending state proceeding.62 Some of Brennan's opinions are relatively narrow in scope.
In two cases early in the Burger years, for example, Brennan wrote
opinions striking down state or local laws prohibiting the use of of-

58. 424 U.S. I (1976). Brennan, Powell, and Stewart supported the entire majority opinion.
59. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 361 (1974) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 471 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974) (federal court abstention not required in declaratory judgment case when state prosecution under allegedly unconstitutional statute is threatened); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 103-04 (1971) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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fensive words."3 In Blount v. Rizzi,14 Brennan simply built on the
foundation of the procedural obscenity decisions of the Warren
Court. 65 Yet, in reading the entire body of Brennan's first amendment opinions, a number of significant general themes appear that
seem to point to a broader theory of constitutional intepretation.
Among these are:
-The protection of political speech is the core value' of the first amendment, but other types of expression also are entitled to vigorous protection
by the Court."'
*Because the first amendment is not absolute, the Court must 0 balance
competing constitutional values in deciding first amendment cases. 7
-Government restrictions on expressive activity are to be subjected to exacting scrutiny, usually through application of some version of the "compelling governmental interest" test.6 8
'A total ban on particular.types of expression is more difficult to justify

than governmental regulation of expressive activity.6 9

For concrete illustrations of each of these themes, selected opinions written by Justice Brennan during the Burger Court years will
be examined.
POLITICAL SPEECH

Although Justice Brennan's voting record in the first amendment
cases of the Burger Court seems to indicate only a slight tendency to
differentiate between political and nonpolitical speech cases, the notion of the primacy of political speech remains a clear and explicit
theme in the Justice's majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions.
The source of the primacy of political speech notion as a principle of
constitutional interpretation perhaps may be traced to Chief Justice
Hughes' majority opinion in Stromberg v. California,70 a decision
63. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415
U.S. 130 (1974). In both cases Brennan took the position that the challenged laws could
not stand because, as interpreted by state courts, they could be applied to punish speech
protected by the first amendment.
64. 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (impounding mail of alleged vendors of obscenity without requirement that government seek prompt judicial determination of obscenity violates
the Constitution).
65. See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
66. See infra text accompanying notes 70-107.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 108-31.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 132-96.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 197-203.
70. 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (statute prohibiting display of a red flag as symbol of
opposition to organized government is unconstitutional). In the majority opinion, Chief
Justice Hughes declared: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that
changes may be obtained by lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system." Id. at 369.
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frequently cited in Brennan's first amendment opinions. 1 More fully
developed in the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn, 2 this approach
received the Warren Court's stamp of approval in Brennan's New
York Times opinion,7 an opinion interpreted by Harry Kalven as
embodying the principle that the "central meaning of the First
Amendment" is the protection of political speech. 74 According to a
recent commentator, "[t]his triumvirate of New York Times v. Sullivan, Harry Kalven, and Alexander Meiklejohn

. .

.spawned a way

of thinking and talking about freedom of speech and press that
quickly came to dominate public discourse and continues to do so
today. 17 5 Without a doubt, this type of rhetoric continues to occupy
a prominent place in Brennan's first amendment opinions.
In an opinion striking down a state law interpreted as restricting a
candidate's campaign rhetoric, 76 for example, Brennan referred to
the "unequivocal protection that the Constitution affords to political
speech," 77 and noted that "[a]t the core of the First Amendment are
certain basic conceptions about the manner in which political discussion in a representative democracy should proceed."17 8 Such emphasis
on the protection of political speech was justifed on the grounds that
free exchange of ideas "provides special vitality to the process traditionally at the heart of American constitutional democracy - the
political campaign. ' ' 79 Crucial as elections are in the functional contract theory of democracy,80 it is clear that Brennan's notion of political speech extends beyond the narrow electoral context, to embrace
a wide range of communications about public policy and the performance of public officials. According to Brennan, a questionnaire
circulated within the District Attorney's office by a disgruntled assistant district attorney constituted political speech "because it dis71. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 467; Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S.
at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Hartlage, 456 U.S. at 55; Connick,
461 U.S. at 161 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 17.
73. 376 U.S. at 254, 256 (1964).
74. Kalven, supra note 16, at 191. Justice Brennan later hinted that he agreed
with Kalven's suggestion that Brennan's New York Times opinion was rooted in
Meiklejohn's interpretation of the first amendment. Brennan, The Supreme Court and
the Meiklejohn Interpretationof the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
75. Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 439
(1983).
76. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
77. Id. at 58.
78. Id. at 52.
79. Id. at 53.

80. M. EDELMAN, supra note 18, at 211-44.
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cussed subjects that could reasonably be expected to be of interest to
persons seeking to develop informed opinions about the manner in
' In
which ... an elected official ... discharges his responsibilities."81

Carey v. Brown,82 Justice Brennan cited Meiklejohn in support of
the premise that "public-issue picketing.., has always rested on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values." 83 Concurring in a majority decision to strike down as unconstitutionally
vague an ordinance requiring solicitors to obtain a permit, Brennan
stressed the burden imposed on political expression, "the core conduct protected by the First Amendment, '84 and quoted Meiklejohn
at length in support of the primacy of political speech.85
A similar emphasis on expression related to the functioning of
government runs through all of Brennan's opinions dealing with the
free press/fair trial conflict. Concurring in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,8 6 he declared that "[c]ommentary and reporting on
the criminal justice system is at the core of First Amendment values,
for the operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import to
citizens concerned with the administration of government. 81 When
the Court explicitly recognized a first amendment right of press and
public to attend criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,"8 Brennan wrote separately to emphasize the "structural role"
of the first amendment "in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government." 89 Writing for the Court in Globe Newspaper Corporation v. Superior Court,90 he cited protection for the
"free discussion of governmental affairs""' as a crucial purpose of
the first amendment, and viewed public access to criminal trials as a
providing an "essential component in our structure of self-government" by affording the public with a means of serving as a check on
the judiciary.92
In Justice Brennan's view, freedom of political assocation occupies
the same exalted place in the first amendment scheme as freedom of
speech and of the press. The Court's per curiam opinion in Buckley
v. Valeo 93 established the groundwork for striking down the expendi81. Connick, 461 U.S. at 163 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
83. Id. at 466-67.
84. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 626 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
85. Id. at 626-28, 626 n.3.
86. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
87. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
88. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
89. Id. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
90. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
91. Id. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
92. Id. at 606.
93. 424 U.S. I (1976).
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ture limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
Amendments by declaring that the restrictions imposed by the act
"operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment
activities," that is "[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates.""' Repeatedly, the opinion emphasizes
the special concern of the first amendment for political association,
as well as political speech. 5 Most explicitly, in Elrod v. Burns,96
Brennan asserted that "political belief and association constitute the
core of those activities protected by the First Amendment"9 " and
justified the Court's decision to declare patronage dismissals violative
of the first amendment on the basis that a system that "compels or
restrains beliefs and association ... is 'at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment.'"98
Even in cases involving first amendment protection for admittedly
nonpolitical expression, Justice Brennan has been inclined to invoke
the notion of the primacy of political speech. Protesting the majority's decision to uphold an FCC decision to impose sanctions on a
broadcaster for airing "indecent" speech, 99 Brennan pointedly
warned that extension of the Court's decision to political speech
would be contrary to "rudimentary First Amendment principles." 10 0
Recently, in Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders,0 1 Brennan
admitted that protection of speech involving the commercial interests
of the speaker is "not the central meaning of the First Amendment," 10 2 yet insisted that the constitutional guarantees should be
interpreted as prohibiting awards of punitive damages without proof
of knowing or reckless falsity.Y03 More generally, Brennan has indicated that important though the protection of politial speech may be
in the constitutional scheme, the first amendment's protections also
embrace a wide variety of other types of speech. In Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia,104 he clearly outlined an expansive view of the first
94. Id. at 14. See Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political
Speech, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
95. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15, 19, 39, 48-49.
96. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
97. Id. at 356.
98. Id. at 357 (quoting Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561,
576 (7th Cir. 1972)).
99. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
100. Id. at 772 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
102. Id. at 775 (Brennan, J., disenting).
103. Id. at 796.
104. 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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amendment protections, citing Emerson 05 for the proposition that
the underlying values of the first amendment include "individual
self-fulfillment" as well as "participation in decision making by all
members of society." 10 6 The same expansive view of first amendment
freedoms, of course, underlies Brennan's position in obscenity cases,
as well as his opinions in favor of first amendment protection for
commerical speech. 10 7 While Brennan has not articulated the justifications for protecting nonpolitical speech as clearly as he has spelled
out the "central meaning" of the first amendment, he has articulated
a view of freedom of expression that goes far beyond a narrow concern with speech essential -to the functioning of a democracy.
BALANCING

Just as Justice Brennan's rhetoric emphasizing the primacy of political speech suggests continuity with his earlier Warren Court opinions, so Brennan has continued in the Burger years to reject first
amendment absolutism. "Of course, not even the right of political
self-expression is completely unfettered," he declared in a dissenting
opinion in 1974.108 Given that the Constitution looks in two direc-

tions at once by granting power to government and limiting that
power, the Court necessarily must balance competing constitutional
values. Normally, the Court's task is to formulate "delicate accommodations"109 between governmental interests and constitutional
rights. On occasion, the Court may be called upon to balance competing first amendment values, as in the case of a clash between the
rights of broadcasters to control the content of programs and the
rights of listeners to receive a wide range of information and
ideas. 110 As a general matter, however, the Court's task is to balance
infringments on expression "against the asserted governmental interests" and to determine whether the government's action "contravenes the First Amendment."11 '
A reading of Justice Brennan's first amendment opinions reveals a
wide range of governmental interests in restricting expression that
Brennan is willing to recognize as legitimate - at least in the abstract. Among such legitimate governmental goals he has included
105. T. EMERSON, supra note 31.
106. Id. at 6-7.
107. E.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (disciplinary rules prohibiting use of illustrations in attorney advertisements violates first
amendment) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 311 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
109. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 977 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I10. C.B.S. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
111. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 320-21 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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such worthy interests as the privacy of the home,112 the integrity of
electoral processes, aa3 and the protection of minor victims of sex
crimes from the further trauma of public testimony," 4 not to mention efficiency, effective government, and electoral accountability." 15
At the state and local level, Brennan has recognized as legitimate
such diverse interests as traffic safety and aesthetics,"16 maintaining
crowd control on state fairgrounds, 1 7 and eradicating sex discrimination." Brennan has gone so far as to concede that the "morality
of the community" 1 9 could be a legitimate matter of state concern,
explaining his refusal to embrace the absolutism of Justices Black
and Douglas in obscenity cases with the observation that such an
approach would result in "stripping the States of power to an extent
that cannot be justified by the commands of the Constitution, at
least so long as there is available an alternative approach that strikes
a better balance between the guarantee of free expression and the
States' legitimate interests." 2 0 A careful assessment of such interests, notably the "special and compelling interest" in protecting
young people 2 ' ultimately led Brennan to the conclusion that statutes designed to control "distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults"' 22 might be upheld, but that laws
prohibiting all dissemination of obscene materials were unconstitutionally overbroad. 2 3 Adoption of this approach, Brennan claimed,
would "guarantee fuller freedom of expression while leaving room
1 24
for the protection of legitimate government interests.'
At the national level, Brennan has recognized as legitimate not
112. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
113. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
114. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S, 596 (1982).
115. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
116. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
117. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
118. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
119. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 108 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan summarized his assessment of possible state interests in suppressing sexuallyoriented expression as follows: "in short, while I cannot say that the interests of the State
- apart from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults - are trivial or nonexistent, I am compelled to conclude that these interests cannot justify the substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation's judicial machinery that inevitably results
from state efforts to bar the distribution even of unprotected material to consenting
adults." Id. at 112-13.
120. Id. at 103.
121. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 776 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring).
122. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 114.
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only the government's interest in national security'125 and the "maintenance of military discipline, morale, and efficiency,' 126 but also
such interests as protecting the mails, 127 as well as preserving the
integrity of the currency and preventing counterfeiting. 28 Both spectrum scarcity and the governmental interest in ensuring adequate
and balanced coverage of political issues have been invoked in Brennan's opinions as justification for government regulation of
broadcasting. 29
For Brennan, of course, recognition of legitimate governmental interests that might justify restrictions on expressive activity is only
the first step in resolving freedom of expression questions. Dissenting
from a majority opinion upholding a decision to prohibit partisan
political speeches on a military base, Brennan declared that "the
First Amendment does not evaporate with the mere intonation of
interests such as national defense, military necessity, or domestic security .

. .

. [T]he inquiry has been whether the exercise of First

Amendment rights necessarily must be circumscribed in order to secure those interests." 30
Brennan shares with his more conservative brethren a belief in the
necessity of balancing. 31 He differs with them, however, on such vital questions as the weight properly attached to competing interests
and the criteria to be used in striking the balance between competing
constitutional values.
STRICT SCRUTINY AND THE COMPELLING GOVERNMENTAL
INTEREST TEST

Although state and federal governments have a number of legitimate governmental interests that might justify the regulation or even
the suppression of expression, Justice Brennan consistently has taken
the position that mere recitation of an important governmental interest is not sufficient. Clearly, he would place the burden of proof on
125. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
126. Glines, 444 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114 (1981).
128. Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
129. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. at 375.
130. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852-53 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Justice Blackmun has expressed the "conservative" view in these words: "The
First Amendment . . . is only one part of an entire Constitution. Article If of the great
document vests in the Executive Branch primary power over the conduct of foreign affairs and places in that branch the responsibility for the Nation's safety. Each provision
of the Constitution is important, and I cannot subscribe to a doctrine of unlimited absolutism for the First Amendment at the the cost of downgrading other provisions." New
York Times, 403 U.S. 713, 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although Justice Brennan
would apply the principle differently, he would agree with the basic sentiments expressed
in Blackmun's opinion.
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governmental litigants seeking to justify restrictions on speech.132
While governmental interests are taken seriously, mere conclusory
statements of the importance of interests as vital as national security" 3' or protection of minor rape victims from trauma 3

are gener-

ally insufficient to persuade Brennan to approve government restrictions on speech. Even when asserted governmental interests are
recognized as compelling, Justice Brennan is still likely to insist on
use of the "least intrusive" means of achieving a legitimate end. On
occasion, empirical proof of the necessity of restricting speech may
be demanded.1 3 5

The basic notion of strict scrutiny clearly and explicitly appears in
several of Brennan's seventeen prevailing opinions during the Burger
years. While the precise language of the test varies from case to
case, it is clear that the Justice's usual approach to balancing in first
amendment cases is based on application of the "compelling governmental interest" test which Brennan developed and applied in such
equal protection cases as Shapiro v. Thompson,

Shevin,3 8

36 Frontierov.

Rich-

ardson, Kahn v.
and Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.' 39 Just
as strategic considerations of internal political dynamics have forced
him to retreat to an "intermediate scrutiny" position in equal protection cases, 40 so Brennan has adopted a position akin to intermediate
scrutiny in some freedom of expression cases as well.14 1 Yet, in the
first amendment area he has continued to utilize the strict scrutiny
approach in a wide variety of cases, and his version of intermediate
scrutiny seems to be administered with a "bite" that makes it diffi137

132. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362.
133. Glines, 444 U.S. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Globe Newspaper Co. 457 U.S. at 607-09.
135. Id. at 609.
136. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residency requirement for welfare recipients
violates equal protection clause).
137. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (military regulations requiring female officers to prove dependency of spouse to establish eligibility for benefits violates
equal protection component of due process clause of fifth amendment).
138. 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (state law providing property tax exemption for widows but not widowers upheld).
139. 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (Social Security regulations denying survivors benefits to
widowers violates due process clause of fifth amendment).
140. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state law prohibiting purchase of 3.2%
beer by males under age of 21 and females under age of 18 violates equal protection
clause). Justice Brennan stated the "intermediate scrutiny" test in these words: "To
withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
141. F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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cult to distinguish from strict scrutiny.14
Brennan's use of the general notion of heightened scrutiny in the
first amendment cases of the Burger Court appears to have its origins in the Paris Adult Theatre I dissent, 143 in which the Justice
indicated that he believed state interests in restricting expression
must not only be substantial, but also must be scrutinized by the
Court with care.144 Less than a year later, the compelling governmental interest test made its appearance in a majority opinion by
Justice White as well as in a vigorous dissenting opinion by Brennan
in Storer v. Brown. 45 Upholding a California electoral code provision requiring an independent candidate to disaffiliate with a political party one year prior to filing as an independent, Justice White
declared that the restriction promoted the "compelling" state interest in "the stability of its electoral system."' 4 In dissent, Brennan
applauded the majority's application of strict scrutiny, 4 7 but argued
that the state had not carried its burden of proving that its legitimate ends could not be attained by "less burdensome means."' 45
The strict scrutiny approach in first amendment cases found its
way into a majority opinion by Justice Brennan a year later. In
Cousins v. Wigoda,' 49 Brennan's point of departure was the view
that "[t]he National Democratic Party and its adherents enjoy a
constitutionally protected right of political association"'' 0 to be vindicated by giving the party's national convention ultimate control
over the selection and qualifications of convention delegates. In this
context, the state's interests in the integrity of the electoral process
and the votes of its citizens could not be deemed sufficiently compelling to allow state courts to enjoin the seating of delegates approved
by the convention's Credentials Committee.' 5 '
The turning point for the Court's application of strict scrutiny was
doubtlessly Buckley.'15 According to the majority, application of
strict scrutiny was appropriate because the FECA Amendments bur142. Id. at 374-81.
143. 413 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 103. Justice Brennan wrote:
Given [the] side effects of state efforts to suppress what is assumed to be unprotected speech, we must scrutinize with care the state interest that is asserted to justify the suppression. For in the absence of some very substantial
interest in suppressing such speech, we can hardly condone the ill effects that
seem to flow inevitably from the effort.

Id.
145. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 736.
Id. at 755-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
419 U.S. 477 (1975).
Id. at 487.
Id. at 491.

152. 424 U.S. I (1976).
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dened political speech and association. 153 Statutory limits on campaign spending could not survive strict scrutiny.154 However, the purpose of limiting the "actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions" was held to
provide a "constitutionally sufficient justification" for upholding the
55
contribution limits imposed by the FECA Amendments.1
In the aftermath of Buckley, the strict scrutiny approach became
a standard feature of Justice Brennan's first amendment opinions. In
fact, strict scrutiny language appears in one form or another in seven
of Brennan's nine prevailing opinions after Buckley. 56 Moreover, in
one of the two remaining opinions Justice Brennan appears to use an
intermediate-scrutiny-with-a-bite approach. 57
Justice Brennan's strict scrutiny approach was more fully developed in Elrod v. Burns.' 58 In Elrod he tackled the question of
whether dismissals of employees of the Cook County sheriff's office
on grounds of partisan affiliation violated the constitutionally protected freedoms of political belief and association. Concluding that
patronage dismissals clearly interfered with the exercise of first
amendment rights, Brennan cited Buckley'59 in support of the proposition that a merely legitimate state interest was inadequate to
support such infringements on the rights of individuals. 60 Rather,
"[t]he interest advanced must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to show the existence of
such an interest.' 61 While recognizing that state interests in electoral accountability and effective government were important, Brennan
concluded that the state had not met its burden of showing that
broad-based patronage dismissals (that is, those that extended be153. Id. at 25.
154. Id. at 44-45.
155. Id. at 26.
156. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion); Carey v. Population
Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 679 (1979) (plurality opinion); Nixon v. Admin'r of Gen'l Serv.,
433 U.S. 425 (1977); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Brown v. Hartlage, 456
U.S. 45 (1982); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
157. F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal. 468 U.S. 364 (1984). The one
first amendment opinion after Buckley in which Brennan appears not to rely on any
theory of heightened scrutiny is Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality
opinion) (first amendment limits discretion of school board in removing books from
school library).
158. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
159. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
160. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362.
161. Id.
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yond top policy-making positions) were absolutely necessary to further compelling state interests. 6 2
63 the Court struck
In Carey v. PopulationServices International,1
down a state law imposing various restrictions on the distribution
and advertising of contraceptives on due process and first amendment grounds. Only four Justices joined the section of Brennan's
opinion applying the compelling governmental interest test to a statute interfering with the "right of privacy,' 6 4 but a majority agreed
that the statute's prohibition of open display or advertising of contraceptives imposed an unconstitutional restriction on commercial
speech."6 5
Perhaps Brennan's most controversial application of strict scrutiny
may be found in a decision striking down a Massachusetts law requiring closure of a courtroom to the press and public during the
testimony of a minor victim in a rape case.166 Building on the first
67
Brennan
amendment values vindicated in Richmond Newspapers,1
declared that the right to attend trials is not absolute, but that when
"the State attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the
disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial
is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest [citations omitted]."'"

Despite

finding that protection of minor victims of sex crimes from the fur69
ther trauma of public testimony was a compelling state interest,1
Brennan concluded that a mandatory closure rule was not justified
when the state interest also could be vindicated by a law allowing a
trial judge to order closure on a case-by-case basis. 70 Nor was the
state's interest in encouraging victims to come forward to testify sufficient, as the state presented no empirical evidence that automatic
1
closure in fact, would, make victims more willing to testify.' '
Two of Brennan's majority opinions resulted in rejection of first
amendment claims despite the use of the analytical framework of
strict scrutiny. 72 Among the issues raised in Nixon v. Administrator
of General Services was the question of whether the provisions of the
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act mandating
archival screening and government control of some of former Presi162. Id. at 372-73.
163. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
164. Id. at 691.
165. Id. at 701-02.
166. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
167. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
168. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606-07.
169. Id. at 607.
170. Id. at 608-09.
171. Id. at 609.
172. Nixon v. Admin'r of Gen'! Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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dent Nixon's tapes and presidential documents violated the former
Chief Executive's first amendment rights."' 3 Conceding that Nixon's
involvement in partisan politics was protected by the Constitution, 4
Justice Brennan concluded, nonetheless, that a compelling public
need for access to the materials outweighed the former President's
claims and that the need could not be met by less restrictive
17 5
means.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,17 6 the national Jaycee organization claimed that application of Minnesota's antidiscrimination
statute to Jaycee chapters infringed on the first amendment associational rights of the organization and its members. While recognizing
that both a freedom of "intimate association" and a freedom of "expressive association" potentially were involved, Brennan wrote an
opinion upholding the statute against the Jaycees' first amendment
challenge. Applying strict scrutiny, Brennan concluded that the
state's interest in "eradicating discrimination against its female citizens" 17 7 was compelling. Nor did the statute infringe the right of
intimate association, because the Jaycees, as a large and unselective
group, were found to be outside of the category of relationsips "worthy of this kind of constitutional protection." 17 8 Taken together,
Nixon and Roberts demonstrate that in Brennan's hands the analytical framework of strict scrutiny can be employed to justify a decision
against first amendment claims, particularly when the constitutional
guarantee is invoked by an "unworthy" litigant.17 9 Still, it is clear
that use of the compelling governmental interest framework normally spells doom for the challenged statute, as in Brennan's opinions striking down state laws imposing restrictions on political
expression.18 0
In one recent first amendment opinion,' Brennan appears to have
relaxed his normal level of strict scrutiny slightly. By a 5-4 vote, the
Court struck down on first amendment grounds a statutory ban on
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

433 U.S. at 425.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 467-68.
468 U.S. 609 (1984).
Id. at 623.
Id. at 620.

179. Justice Brennan's approach in these cases seems to mirror Chief Justice Warren's view that the protections of the Bill of Rights should not be extended to
ing citizens," such as gamblers and pornographers. See G. WHITE, supra note"undeserv6, at 361.
180. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S.
45
(1982).
181.

F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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editorializing by educational broadcasting stations that received
grants from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. While conceding the power of Congress to regulate educational broadcasting,
Brennan declared that "the First Amendment must inform and give
shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its regulatory
power in this area. 182 The test of whether a restriction violated
broadcaster rights depended on whether the Court was "satisfied
that the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest .

.. ""'.Balancing the first amendment rights of

broadcasters against a governmental restriction that applied to political speech, Brennan concluded that "less restrictive means" were
available to dispel fears of governmental control of public broadcasting.184 Breaking away from her normal voting alliance with Justice
Rehnquist,""5 Justice O'Connor not only voted to support the first
amendment claim, but also provided the fifth vote necessary for formation of a majority opinion coalition. In all probability, Brennan's
adoption of "intermediate scrutiny" was essential to this88outcome,
for in Globe Newspaper Corporation v. Superior Court' Justice
O'Connor had joined the majority voting coalition, yet refused to enopinion employing the compelling governmental indorse Brennan's
87
terest test.1
In addition to spelling out his support for strict scrutiny in majority opinions, Justice Brennan has used concurring and dissenting
of first amendment
opinions to develop in more detail his theories
88
interpretation. Dissenting in Brown v. Glines,1 he took the opportunity to declare that "prior censorship of expression can be justified
only by the most compelling governmental interests" and that mere
was not
invocation of a governmental interest in military discipline
89
necessarily sufficient to justify restrictions on expression.
Similarly, Brennan felt that the majority had undervalued the first
amendment interests at stake in Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent.' 0° In the face of a first amendment challenge, the
Court upheld a Los Angeles city ordinance prohibiting the posting of
signs, including campaign signs, on public property. According to
Justice Stevens, the ordinance was adequately justified by the public
191
interest in controlling "visual blight."' Charging that "the Court's
182. Id. at 378.
183. Id. at 380 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 395.
185. Scheb & Ailshie, supra note 38, at 11-12.
186. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
187. Id. at 611 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
189. Id. at 364 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
191. Id. at 810.
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lenient approach towards the restriction of speech for reasons of aesthetics threatens seriously to undermine the protections of the First
Amendment," 1 2 Justice Brennan dissented. Some form of heightened scrutiny was required, Brennan declared, because the city's effort to ban the use of an important medium of communication on
aesthetic grounds "creates special dangers to our First Amendment
freedoms." 193 An ordinance aimed at suppressing speech based on its
content would require a "compelling state interest." Even a contentneutral restriction would require application of intermediate scrutiny.19 4 Since Los Angeles had not shown that the ordinance was
part of a comprehensive plan to pursue aesthetic goals,' 5 Brennan
concluded that the city had not carried its burden of demonstrating
that "the goals pursued are substantial and that the manner in
which they are pursued is no more restrictive of speech than is
necessary."' 96
OTHER THEMES

Just as Justice Brennan suggested in Taxpayers for Vincent that
heightened scrutiny was required when the government sought to
ban the use of a particular medium of expression, 9 7 so the idea that
a total ban on particular types of expression is more difficult to justify than governmental regulation of expression is a theme running
through many of Brennan's first amendment opinions. In his Paris
Adult Theatre I dissent, Brennan made clear that one major vice of
most anti-obscenity laws was the effort wholly to suppress an entire
class of expression.' 98 Similarly, in FCCv. League of Women Voters
of California,9 9 Brennan indicated that while a total ban on editorializing by public broadcasting stations could not pass constitutional
muster, such a carefully tailored regulation as a disclaimer requirement might well be upheld.200 In C.B.S. v. Democratic National
Committee,2 1' Brennan argued that an FCC-approved network policy of refusing to sell advertising time to "groups or individuals wish192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 818 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 828.
Id. at 821.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 830-31.
See supra text accompanying notes 190-95.
413 U.S. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

199. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
200. Id. at 395.
201. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
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ing to speak out on controversial issues of public importance" 02 ran
afoul of first amendment values because the result was a total exclusion of virtually all citizens from the "most efficient and effective
'marketplace of ideas' ever devised." 2 3
Finally, it should be noted that running through many of Brennan's first amendment opinions is a concern with the possible "chilling effects" of a vague statute on protected expression. According to
Justice Brennan, a state law prohibiting the use of offensive words
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because, as construed, it
could be applied to punish protected speech, including political
speech.204 Likewise, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,0 5 he argued that
Oklahoma's "Little Hatch Act" should be struck down on its face
because it readily could be applied to prohibit expressive activity
protected by the first amendment. Among the problems with obscenity statutes was the probability that any attempt to define obscenity
would be intolerably vague.206 In short, it was the duty of the Supreme Court to take special care to prevent unjustified governmental
action that could chill the exercise of first amendment rights.
CONCLUSION

In the years since the retirement of Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan - with Justice Marshall as a loyal ally - has emerged as the
Supreme Court Justice most strongly committed to judicial protection of freedom of expression. While the Court has voted to reject
constitutional claims in more than half of the first amendment cases
heard and decided during the Burger years, Brennan has supported
claimants of first amendment rights in nearly eighty percent of the
cases. Brennan's emphasis on the protection of political speech has
remained a significant feature of his opinions since 1969. At least at
the rhetorical level, he continues to stress the central meaning of the
first amendment and to adhere to the idea that the protection of political speech is the "core" value -of the first amendment. Yet, at the
same time, he seems to have transcended the view of such conservative jurists as Robert Bork that only explictly political speech is entitled to first amendment protection. 07 Just as Meiklejohn himself expanded his notion of protected speech to include education, science,
literature and the arts, as well as public discussion of public is202. Id. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 195.
204. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
205. 413 U.S. 601, 621 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207. See Bork, supra note 47, at 20. For more recent development of Judge Bork's
view on the "central meaning" of the First Amendment, see Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d
970, 993 (D.C. Cir., 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
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sues, z°8 so Brennan has embraced the view that the values of the first
amendment include "individual self-fulfillment" as well as "participation in decision making by all members of society. ' 209 While adhering to the "functional contract" theory of democracy as a basis
for judicial protection of rights, he has superimposed on this position
a point of view akin to Douglas' "liberal natural rights theory. '210
Yet, the mature Brennan has not followed his predecessor down
the path of first amendment absolutism. In his opinions, he seems to
take seriously governmental interests asserted as justification for restrictions on expressive activity. The unavoidable necessity for the
Court to balance competing interests remains a crucial feature of
Brennan's doctrine of freedom of expression. Although his assessment of the weight to be attached to these interests clearly tips the
scales to the side of the individual, he has shown a willingness to
reject some first amendment claims, particularly those asserted by
"unworthy" litigants211 whose claims seemed to Brennan to "trivialize" constitutional guarantees.212 Clearly, it makes a difference
whose ox is gored.
The most striking feature of Brennan's doctrine of freedom of expression appears to be his consistent use of the analytical framework
of "heightened scrutiny" as a tool to assist the Justices in balancing
competing considerations. Just as he would have preferred to use the
"compelling governmental interest" test in the equal protection context,21 3 so he would subject restrictions on expression to the same
standard of strict scrutiny in a wide variety of cases. Even when the
compelling governmental interest test is inappropriate, Brennan insists on a version of intermediate scrutiny that places a heavy burden
of justification on any governmental agency that seeks to restrict expression. Necessary though balancing may be, in Brennan's view the
most vital task of the Court is nothing less than the vigorous protection of freedom of expression and other fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
208.
257.

Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245,

209. T.

EMERSON, supra note 31, at 6-7.
210. M. EDELMAN, supra note 18.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 172-79.
212. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger called Brennan's opinion in Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347 (1976) a "classic example of trivializing constitutional adjudication." Id. at
375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Whatever one may think of the charge as applied to this
case, the 39 Burger Court cases in which Brennan voted to reject first amendment claims
make clear that there are definite limits to Brennan's willingness to endorse tenuous freedom of expression claims.
213. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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